In contrast to this idealized view of how the decision-making process should occur, various complications frequently arise:

• Reform activities are often too broad and overly ambitious in scope. There seems a built-in bias in the PFM area to be overly optimistic about what can be achieved and to underestimate the time required to achieve it. Such excessive optimism also seems to be a common feature of large-scale public projects.

• Donor assistance to PFM remains rather homogeneous despite continuous efforts to tailor reforms to country needs. Despite this effort and the insistence by donors that reforms should be led by the authorities and address their perceived problems, such tailoring is not always put into practice. For instance, Andrews (2007, 2009, 2010 [[AQ: or do you wish to cite Andrews et al. (2015 or both?]] found a disturbing similarity in reforms being pursued in Africa, regardless of differences in the countries’ contexts and stages of PFM system development. Andrews perceived that bureaucratic agencies were being biased toward what has worked in the past or what they are familiar with—using the phrase, “institutional isomorphism.” a

• Reform packages targeting PFM reforms are rather homogeneous. Fritz, Verhoevn, and Avenia (2017) found that these packages often include medium-term expenditure frameworks and program budgeting to achieve a better policy orientation of budgets; introduction of new budget classifications and accounting standards (including, in many countries, the ambition to shift to International Public Sector Accounting Standards [IPSAS]); establishment and upgrading of information technology systems for managing public expenditures; better cash management, including the introduction of treasury single accounts; stronger internal audit and external audit; and ex post accountability. Reform packages typically focus on a selection of this set of reforms and, in some cases, most or all of these areas. The considerable homogeneity of reform intentions, also reflected in the five case studies (Georgia, Nepal, Niger, the Philippines, and Tanzania) on which this conclusion builds, shows that the tailoring of reforms to a country’s context is often inadequate.

• Countries are often biased toward agreeing with donor proposals when political benefits (and resources) come up-front and costs (if any) come much later. Part of the explanation for this bias arises from the way in which local authorities enter into dialogue with donors. Given the usual political cycle, the time horizon of the politician’s term of office tends to be shorter than that of the donors. Resources come first, and, given the nature of PFM reforms, results occur only after a considerable time. In contrast, donors want reform programs, and they stress the importance of having local authorities lead and drive the reform. However, how the political commitment is evidenced and sustained deserves more consideration in the design of reform programs.